Why is the Employment Protection Stricter in Europe than in the US? by Belot, M.V.K.
No. 2001-79
WHY IS THE EMPLOYMENT PROTECTION
STRICTER IN EUROPE THAN IN THE US?
By Michèle Belot
October 2001
ISSN 0924-7815Why is the employment protection stricter in
Europe than in the US?
Michµ ele Belot¤
Department of Economics and CentER, Tilburg University
October 23, 2001
Abstract
In this paper, we argue that the reason why the United States prefer a
lower level of employment protection than the European countries lies in
the di®erences in gains and costs from geographical mobility. We present
a model where labor migration and employment protection are both de-
termined endogenously. The labor market is modeled within a matching
framework, where the employment protection reduces boththe job ¯nding
and ¯ring rates. Countries with low migration costs and high economic
heterogeneity may prefer no employment protection so that workers can
move quickly to better horizons rather than being maintained in low pro-
ductive activities.
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1 Introduction
Employment protection is on average stricter in the US than in Europe. Long
being blamed for the poor European labor market performance, together with
other rigid labor market institutions, employment protection has recently, to
some extent, been freed of charges. The role of the employment protection
on the unemployment rate would be minor. However, employment protection
has a signi¯cant negative e®ect on the labor market in°ows and, in particular,
unemployment in- and out°ows (Nickell (1999) and OECD (1999)).
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1Most of the European countries have been reforming their employment pro-
tection legislation (EPL) over the last decade, towards more °exibility essen-
tially. Reforming these institutions might however be limited by the lack of
political support. Saint-Paul (2000) has provided a major contribution with
respect to the political economy of labor market institutions. He argues that
these institutions bene¯t to a well-organized part of the population so that the
implementation of a reform would be di±cult. Rigid labor market institutions
in Europe have given birth to large rents on the worker side, and the median
voter is supposed to belong to that category.
While the consequences of the di®erences in institutions between the US and
Europe are relatively well identi¯ed, their origins are more obscure. These coun-
tries are democracies and these institutions can be considered as the outcome
of a democratic political process. The question is then: Why do the Europeans
need employment protection while the Americans do not? Answering this ques-
tion will help us to identify more clearly the role of employment protection and
hopefully contribute to the large current debate on the reform of the EPL.
In this paper, we relate the di®erences in observed EPL to exogenous and
fundamental di®erences in two dimensions: the economic heterogeneity and the
migration costs. We argue that Americans desire a lower level of employment
protection because the economic and cultural organization of the country pro-
vides anaturalinsurance against the risks of losing ajob. European countries, on
the other hand, are small, economically and culturally more homogenous when
compared individually to the United States so that migration within countries
makes less sense than it does in the United States. Furthermore, people do not
migrate very much within their country even in the presence of inter-regional
di®erentials. Reasons might be that other institutions (such as the regulation of
the housing market or rigid labor market institutions) increase the moving costs.
Euro-Land as a whole is, as we shall see in the empirical evidence, economically
more heterogeneous than the United States.
The originality of our paper is that it links the e±ciency of migration as an
insurance device to the preferences of the workers with respect to employment
2protection. Besides other factors that we consider as exogenous here (such as
the cultural and social barriers, the regulations of the housing market, the eco-
nomic diversity of the country), employment protection also plays a crucial role
in determining how e±cient migration is as an insurance device. Employment
protection typically reduces the job ¯nding and ¯ring rates so that workers re-
main maintained in low productive activities and cannot move quickly to the
best productive places. When the other exogenous factors are such that mi-
gration could work well as an insurance device, we argue that the workers then
prefer a low level of employment protection, so that job ¯ndingrates are high and
they can move quickly to better horizons. When however there are important
barriers to migration, the majority of the workers prefer their job to be safe and
enjoying insider power. Hence, the relationship between employment turnover
and employment protection should go in both directions and should be nega-
tive, as we observe in the empirical facts. Hassler and Rodriguez-Mora (1999)
also suggest this type of relationship but then between employment turnover
and unemployment insurance. Their argument however is di®erent from ours.
In particular, employment turnover determines how saving and borrowing are
good substitutes for the unemployment insurance. Hence they show that a low
turnover increase the persistence of income shocks and makes unemployment
insurance relatively more attractive.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present some stylized facts
and a brief review of the literature on employment protection and migration.
In section 3, we introduce the model, and discuss the equilibria. In section 4,
we conduct a numerical experiment to illustrate the mechanisms of the model.
In section 5, we discuss our results and assumptions. Finally, we conclude in
section 6.
32 Employment protection and migration - Evi-
dence and theory
The employment protection legislation (EPL) is a set of rules that makes it
harder for the ¯rms to get rid of their workers. A survey of its recent evolution
in OECD countries can be found in the OECD Employment Outlook (1999).
Employment protection covers a series of legal arrangements regulating the end-
ing of so-called open-end contracts and temporary arrangements. The OECD
proposes an indicator summarizing the degree of strictness of employment pro-
tection. We re-organized the table by ranking all the countries according to their
degree of strictness of EPL relative to open-end contracts (Table 1). On the top
of the table (i.e. the most °exible countries), we ¯nd the Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. Then come the Northern countries and continental European countries.
Southern Europe is at the bottom of the table.
[Insert Table 1 here]
There is a huge literature on the e®ects of employment protection on labor
market performance. There seems however to be a consensus on the following:
Employment protection does not have much e®ect on the level of unemployment
but does have an e®ect on the labor market °ows and, in particular, on the
unemployment in- and out°ows (Nickell (1999), OECD (1999)). In other words,
the empirical evidence suggests that it is easier for an unemployed person to ¯nd
a job in a °exible country than in a rigid one (see for example Schettkat (1997)).
This point is crucial for the argument of our paper. A population who does not
support employment protection chooses high job ¯nding and ¯ring rates, which
guarantee that workers can move quickly from low productive places to high
productive ones. Employment protection reduces the gains from migration of
unemployed looking for better jobs in other regions of the country.
This raises the question of why such rigidities exist in the ¯rst place. These
countries are democracies and this type of institution is the outcome of a polit-
ical process. Saint-Paul (1997) suggests that the reason why EPL is stricter in
Europe than in the US relies on other existing rigidities, such as powerful union
4organizations. In this paper, we propose an alternative (but not rival) explana-
tion relying on the di®erence in the gains and costs from migration. The United
States are usually thought of as the country where people move fast and to a
large extent. Europe on the other hand shows a lower degree of labor mobility,
even within countries (see Thomas (1994), Decressin and Fatas (1995)).
Migration can be thought of as an insurance device against income °uc-
tuations, in the absence of well-functioning ¯nancial markets. Employment
protection legislation is a competing instrument to reduce the income variation
associated with labor market shocks (such as an aggregate shock to productiv-
ity). Stark (1991) introduces migration as a risk-diversi¯cation device in the
context of rural-urban migration in developing countries. However, when mi-
gration is not possible, i.e. when this insurance device is not available, one
needs a substitute for it. Hence, income and job protection systems can be
thought as alternative insurance devices when ¯nancial markets are absent and
malfunctioning and when migration is too costly.
There is a lack of reliable statisticalmaterial on migration in di®erent regions
of di®erent nation states of Europe. Puhani (2001) summarizes studies on labor
mobility in OECD countries. These studies consider both migration between
countries and within countries. What is usually observed is that migration as
a share of the total population is lower in Europe than in the United States.
The OECD (1986) shows that interregional migration is the highest in the USA,
Australia and Canada and the lowest in Europe. A study by De Grauwe and
Vanhaverbeke (1993) also shows that interregional mobility di®ers across Eu-
ropean states. Hence, interregional mobility in the Southern countries (Spain,
Italy) is less than half as large as in the Northern and continental ones (Den-
mark, Finland, France, the Netherlands and UK). These observations are very
interesting for our purpose since this ordering corresponds precisely to the one
we presented above, reporting the degrees of strictness of employment protection
legislation. Hence, the empirical facts show that lower mobile countries have a
stricter employment protection. However this is only an observed correlation,
that does not tell anything about the direction of the causality. It could be that
5strong employment protection actually reduces labor mobility rather than the
other way around. We will come back on this point later in this section.
Migration can work as a risk diversi¯cation device in the presence of eco-
nomic heterogeneity. We should investigate two elements. First, labor mobility
could be lower in Europe because there are less asymmetries, a larger economic
homogeneity. Second, we should investigate whether the responses to these
asymmetries are indeed lower in Europe than in the US.
Considering the ¯rst point, it is certainly true if one compares the United
States with each European country in particular. The size of the United States
is indeed such that the economic heterogeneity is larger than in any particular
European country. This means that all else equal, migration would work less
e±ciently as an insurance device within European countries than within the
United States.
Looking on the other hand at the economic heterogeneity of Euro-Land as
a whole, the empirical evidence suggests the opposite. Hence, Bentivogli and
Pagano (1999) note that asymmetric shocks are more likely to occur in Europe
than in the US. This means that one should observe relatively more migration
between European countries than within them, which is not supported by the
empirical facts.
Concerning the second point, before claiming that migration does not work
as an insurance device in Europe but does in the US, we should indeed check that
the reason why people donot move in Europe is not linked to economic variables.
In other words, we should observe that di®erentials in economic variables that
could theoretically determine migration (such as unemployment di®erentials,
wage di®erentials) do not stimulate migration. This would show that people
do not use migration as a risk diversi¯cation device. Studies by Barro and
Sala-i-Martin (1995) and Gros (1996) show that European migratory responses
to unemployment and wage di®erentials between and within nation states are
lower in Europe than in the United States. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995)
estimate the elasticities of net migration into a region with respect to economic
variables such as the per capita income in that region. They ¯nd a signi¯cant
6positive coe±cient for the United States: A 10 percent di®erential in income
per capita raises net-in-migration to bring the region's population growth rate
up by 0.26 percent per year. This is apparently not such a strong e®ect but
it is still stronger than the ones estimated for the European countries (where
most of them are even insigni¯cant). De Grauwe and Vanhaverbeke (1993)
also show that interregional migration is relatively low in Southern European
countries, despite the existence of higher income di®erentials in the South. In
the same line of studies, Bentivogli and Pagano (1999) ¯nd that the response
of wage and unemployment di®erentials is much stronger in the US than in the
European regions taking part to the launching of the Euro-zone. They ¯nd that
unemployment di®erentials stimulate population °ows 10 times as much in the
US than in Euro-Land and that wage di®erentials give rise to °ows that are
double the size in the US than in Euro-Land.
The question is then: why do people not migrate to better horizons? The
obvious answer is that there are large social and cultural barriers. But this is
not a very strong argument to explain low mobility within countries. Oswald
(1996) and Gros (1996) mentions the role played by the regulation of the housing
market. Gros observes in Europe a strong correlation between the rate of inter-
regional migration and the proportion of houses occupied by their owners in
1991 and 1992. Oswald shows that di®erences in the "home ownerships" across
OECD countries can explain part of the di®erences in observed unemployment
rates. Another reason could be that European rigid labor market institutions
make its workers relatively more attached to their roots. A recent paper by
Hassler et al. (2001) argues that there is a circular relationship between the un-
employment insurance system and the geographic attachment of the labor force
(and so the low mobility). The more generous the unemployment system the
more likely you are attached to your "region" and the more attached you are the
stronger you support unemployment insurance. They ¯nd under certain condi-
tions that two self-reinforcing equilibria can exist: one with low insurance, low
mobility and high unemployment (typically the "European case") and the other
one with high insurance, high mobility and low unemployment (typically the
7"American case"). The reason why relatively unattached populations prefer a
lower level of insurance lies in the existence of a ¯scal distortion (unemployment
bene¯ts are ¯nanced by taxes raised on labor). In the same line of reasoning,
we argue here that these institutions, and in particular employment protection,
have been chosen because of the existence of moving costs related to more essen-
tial barriers such as the regulation of the housing market, the cultural and social
barriers, etc. Once in place these institutions reduce even further the incentives
to migrate but we think that they ¯rst should be thought as the consequence of
a malfunctioning insurance device (migration).
3 The model
The objective of our paper is to show that the migration costs determine the
preferences of the population with respect to employment protection. Employ-
ment protection plays two important roles for the workers. First, it protects
their job and gives them some insider power (enables them to bargain higher
wages). Second, it reduces both job creation and job destruction. This has two
implications. It means ¯rst that it is more di±cult for an unemployed worker to
¯nd a job and, second, that some low productive jobs are maintained although
they would disappear if there was no employment protection.
Suppose the workers can choose between a ¯xed ¯ring cost and no ¯ring cost.
One crucial aspect determining her choice is the exogenous migration gains and
costs she has to incur when she wants to move to better horizons. Hence, if
these gains are high (because for example of a large economic heterogeneity)
and these costs are low (because for example of a larger cultural homogeneity),
the median voter may be willing to trade the insider gains from employment
protection for a better outside option. Indeed, without employment protection,
job creation is high and it is relatively easy for an unemployed worker to ¯nd a
job. If the ¯ring cost is high on the other hand, this worker prefers her job to
be safe even if this means it to be maintained at low productivity levels.
We now describe in detail the model.
83.1 Basic framework
We consider one country, that can be divided in two economic regions A and
B. The level of employment protection is determined at the national level.
Firms and workers form matches with a match-speci¯c productivity x, that
corresponds to a random draw from a uniform distribution f(x) de¯ned on the
interval [0;1]:
The productivity of the match also depends on the state of nature in which
the region is. Let us denote by " the stochastic regional shock. If a region is
booming (state of the world g), all match-speci¯c productivities are augmented
by "g: This increment is independent of the initial draw x. This means that a
booming region shifts the distribution of productivities by "g: If a region is on the
other hand stagnating (state of the world b), all match productivities are simply
the match-speci¯c productivities x: The behavior of " can be represented by a
symmetric two-state Markov chain. " = f0;"gg and the stochastic transition
matrix associated with it is:
µ
(1 ¡ ¸) ¸
¸ (1 ¡ ¸)
¶
;
The parameters ¸ and "g represent in our framework the economic hetero-
geneity (or size of the country). The larger the country or the more diversi¯ed
it is, the larger ¸ and "g.
A worker and a ¯rm meet at a rate determined by a matching function
m(u;v), that exerts constant returns to scale. We de¯ne µ = v
u as the labor
market tightness, i.e. the number of vacancies (v) available per unemployed
worker (u being the total number of unemployed workers). The probability that
an unemployed worker matches with a vacancy is then equal to m(µ) =
m(u;v)
u






Some matches do not lead to an employment relationship because their pro-
ductivity is too low. We denote by xb and xg the productivity °oors above
which the worker and the ¯rm ¯nd it pro¯table to establish an employment
relationship. The productivity of a match remains constant over time, so that
9the only reason why the partners could separate is when the region is hit by
an aggregate shock. Then low productive matches are destroyed and workers
become unemployed. We denote by e x the productivity threshold under which
matches are destroyed once hit by an aggregate negative shock. Hence, in a
boom, we can de¯ne two types of jobs: the surviving jobs (that will survive
even if the region is hit by a negative productivity shock) and the dying jobs
(that will not survive to the slump). In a slump, there are on the other hand
only surviving jobs since the only shock that can happen would improve the
productivity of the matches.
The regions are hit by perfectly negatively correlated aggregate shocks. This
means that when region A is in a boom, region B is in a slump, and vice versa.
Each ¯rm has one job slot that can be opened as a vacancy or ¯lled by a
worker. When the match the ¯rm forms with the worker is hit by a su±ciently
negative shock, the partners ¯nd it e±cient to separate. The ¯rm then incurs
a ¯ring cost cf (that is a pure waste). The worker becomes unemployed after
separation and looks for another job with a constant search intensity.
Unemployed workers can either search for a job in their own region or in the
neighboring one. If they decide to look for a job in the neighboring region, they
incur a ¯xed sunk cost cm: This migration cost represents in this framework the
set of regulations making it harder to leave your region (housing regulations) or
cultural and social barriers.
The total unemployment in a region k, k = g;b is then equal to the sum of
the resident1 unemployment uk;k and the "migrating" unemployment uk;j with
k 6= j; and both ¸ 0:
uk = uk;k + uk;j; (1)
1A resident unemployed should be understood here as "currently searching on this partic-
ular labour market". A resident unemployed might in particular be a worker who originates
from another region but was employed before in the region where she is searching for a job
now.
103.2 Bellman equations
3.2.1 Values of being unemployed
The respective values of being unemployed in a good and bad regions are deter-
mined as follows:
rUg = b + m(µg)(E(Wg) ¡ Ug) + ¸max[Ub;Ug ¡ cm]; (2)
rUb = b + m(µb)(E(Wb) ¡ Ub) + ¸max[Ug;Ub ¡ cm]; (3)
where b is the unemployment bene¯t, E(Wk) is the expected value of working
in a region k; k = g;b: While being unemployed in the region k, a worker bene¯ts
from an unemployment income (that might as well be the value of leisure or
other non-market activities); she ¯nds a job with probability m(µk), for which
the corresponding expected gain is equal to E(Wk) ¡ Uk and ¯nally, she faces
the risk ¸ of her region switching to the other state of the world. In the latter
case, she might either stay in her region or migrate to the other region and incur
the migration cost cm: She migrates only if it is pro¯table to do so.
What are the main di®erences between the values of being unemployed in
a bad and in a good region? First, the respective probabilities of ¯nding a job
may di®er. It is easier to ¯nd a job in a tighter labor market. The tightness of
the labor market is here determined both by migration decisions and vacancy
posting. Second, once she ¯nds a job, the expected value of this job may di®er
according to the state of the world. The intuition suggests that the expected
value of working in a good region is higher than in a bad region. We show later
that it is indeed the case.
3.2.2 Values of working
It is helpful for the analysis to distinguish between two types of jobs: surviving
(s) and dying (d) jobs. Surviving jobs are those which survive negative produc-
tivity shocks. Dying jobs are those which do not. We observe simultaneously
11both types of jobs in a good region only. In a bad region there are typically
surviving jobs only. We determine later the conditions under which a job is
surviving or dying.
We de¯ne the value of working in a surviving job W s
g(x) in a good region as
a function of the match-speci¯c productivity x:
rW
s




g(x) ¡ Wb(x)); (4)
where ws
g(x) is the corresponding wage and Wb(x) is the value of working in
a (surviving) job in a bad region.
The value of working in a dying job W d
g (x) in a good region is:
rW
d




g (x) ¡ max[Ug ¡ cm;Ub]); (5)
where wd
g(x) is the corresponding wage. A worker in a dying job loses by
de¯nition her job when the regional shock arises. Being unemployed, she has
the choice to stay unemployed in the stagnating region or move to the booming
neighboring region (and then incur the migration cost).
Finally, the value of working in a bad region is:
rWb(x) = wb(x) ¡ ¸(Wb(x) ¡ W
s
g (x)); (6)
where wb(x) is the corresponding wage.
3.2.3 Vacancy posting
Firms post vacancies on the labor market. The value of posting a vacancy Vk
in a region k; k = g;b, is de¯ned as follows:
rVk = ¡cr + q(µk)(E(Jk) ¡ Vk) + ¸(Vj ¡ Vk); (7)
where cr is the recruitment cost (or °ow cost of posting a vacancy), q(µk) is
the probability of matching with an unemployed worker, E(Jk) is the expected
value of ¯lling a vacancy in region k and Vj is the value of posting a vacancy in
region j, with j 6= k:
12We assume that there is free entry on the vacancy market, so that ¯rms post
vacancies until the value of doing so is equal to 0:
rVg = rVb = 0: (8)
This implies that vacancy posting is such that the expected cost of posting






Condition [9] is usually referred to as the job creation condition. It implies
here that the market tightness is the highest, in equilibrium, in the region
that has the highest expected value of ¯lling a vacancy (this means even after
migration).
3.2.4 Values of ¯lling a vacancy
We now turn to the equations determining the behavior of the ¯rms. Again the
distinction between the two types of jobs and regions is useful.
The respective values Js
g(x);Jd
g (x) and Jb(x) of ¯lling a vacancy with a match
with idiosyncratic productivity x are de¯ned as follows:
rJ s
g(x) = x + "g ¡ ws
g(x) ¡ ¸(J s
g(x) ¡ Jb(x)); (10)
rJ
d




g(x) ¡ Vb ¡ (¡cf)); (11)
rJb(x) = x ¡ wb(x) ¡ ¸(Jb(x) ¡ J
s
g(x)); (12)
where Vb is the value of posting a vacancy in a bad region.
The basic di®erence between the valuations of the jobs is that when ¯lling
a vacancy with a dying job, the ¯rm knows that it will have to ¯re the worker
with probability ¸: The job then becomes vacant and the ¯rm has to pay the
¯ring cost cf:
Let us now turn tothe formal description of our model. Since we assume that
the agents are perfectly farsighted, we solve the model by backward induction.
133.3 Wage bargaining
The worker and the ¯rm bargain over the wages. We assume Nash-bargaining
so that the wage maximizes a weighted average of the respective surplus of the
bargaining partners:
ws





g (x) ¡ U g
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J s










g (x) ¡ U g)
¯(J
d
g(x) ¡ Vg ¡ (¡cf))
1¡¯; (14)





(Jb(x) ¡ Vb ¡ (¡cf))
1¡¯ ; (15)
where ¯ is the worker's relative bargaining power and U k = max[U¤
k ;U ¤
j ¡
cm]; with k 6= j, de¯nes the outside option of the worker: it is either being
unemployed in the region where she is now or being unemployed in the other
region but then incurring the migration cost in order to move there.
The equilibrium bargained wages are the following2:
ws






b)) + ¯ (x + "g + rcf); (16)






b)) + ¯ (x + rcf); (17)
At a given match-speci¯c productivity level x, the equilibrium wage is the
same in a dying and in a surviving job. In both bad and good regions, the
wage increases with the outside option Uk, with the total productivity of the
match and with two types of insider power coming from the ¯ring cost and the
di®erence between the two outside options. The ¯rst type is usually referred
to as the worker insider power, i.e. the power of being already inside the ¯rm.
The second type is what we call here the region insider power, i.e. the power
2See Appendix 7.1 for formal derivations.
14or weakness of being in the region. Suppose that workers in the good region
are better o® than workers in the bad region. If there is no migration cost,
one should expect that the outside options in both regions should converge to
each other. If there is a migration cost however, workers in a good region are
better o® because they do not su®er so much from the competition of migrant
workers. Workers in a bad region, on the other hand, are "trapped" in their
region. Therefore, this regional insider power pushes the wages up in a good
region and down in the bad region (it is then more a weakness than a power).
Proposition 1 Employment protection gives insider gains to the worker, by




In this section, we determine two types of match-speci¯c productivity thresh-
olds. First, the thresholds at which the ¯rm is indi®erent between o®ering a
contract or not (xb and xg) and second, the threshold at which the ¯rm is
indi®erent between a surviving job and a dying job.
In order to determine these thresholds, we ¯rst need to calculate the equilib-










































3See Appendix 7.2 for formal derivations.
15The value of ¯lling a vacancy increases in all jobs with the match-speci¯c
productivity, the regional productivity increment and decreases with the outside
option, the regional insider power and the ¯ring cost.




b, employment protection reduces the value of
¯lling a vacancy, in all jobs and both regions.
Proof. Straightforward.
Lemma 3 The value of ¯lling a vacancy with a dying job has a steeper slope











@x ; since ¸ > 0:
What is interesting for our purpose is that this e®ect is stronger for dying
jobs than surviving ones. Indeed, employment protection then not only provides
the workers with some insider power but represent an e®ective cost to be paid
by the ¯rm with probability ¸:
Let us now turn to the determination of the productivity thresholds4.
The lowest productivity level acceptable for the ¯rm to employ the worker





g is such that J d
g (xd
g) = 0; xs
g is such that Js
g(xs
g) = 0: In words, the
minimum level of productivity required to start an employment relationship in
a booming region is the productivity level such that the corresponding value of
matching for the ¯rm is equal to 0. When xd
g < xs
g; dying jobs exist and the
lowest productive job is dying. When xd
g ¸ xs
g; dying jobs do not exist and the
lowest productive job is surviving.
xs











4See Appendix 7.3 for formal derivations.
16xd
g is such that:
xd










The lowest match-speci¯c productivity level acceptable for a ¯rm to start
an employment relationship in a stagnating region, denoted xb; is such that










Expressions [22], [23] and [24] establish a positive relationship between the
outside option in one region (Uk) and the minimum productivity required at
entry. This is the second step in job creation (after vacancy posting, that we
analyze in the next section). The higher the outside option, the higher the
productivity required at entry. This relationship depends on other parameters.
We summarize their in°uences in the three next propositions.




b, employment protection pushes the productiv-
ity required at entry up, in all jobs and both regions.




b, economic heterogeneity decreases the pro-
ductivity required at entry, in all jobs and both regions.
Proposition 6 Given U
¤
g, the good-region insider power increases the produc-
tivity required at entry, in dying jobs.
Proof. Straightforward.
Hence, the economic heterogeneity stimulates job creation while the good-
region insider power reduces it.
The threshold between a dying and surviving job e x is de¯ned as follows:
e x = minfxs
g; e xd;sg; (25)
where e xd;s is such that:
J
d
g (e xd;s) = J
s
g(e xd;s); (26)
17which leads to the following expression for e xd;s:









Equation [27] determines the productivity limit for job destruction. Under
this productivity limit, jobs are destroyed once the region falls into slump: these
jobs are dying jobs. The higher the outside option U
¤
b the more likely a job will
be destroyed. Furthermore5, the outside option U
¤
b is an increasing function
of µg and µb: The intuition is simple: the tighter the market, the easier it is
for unemployed to ¯nd a job and so the higher the value of being unemployed.
Hence equation [27] can be interpreted as the job destruction condition.
Proposition 7 Given µb;µg and xg employment protection has an ambiguous
e®ect on job destruction.
Proof. The ¯ring cost has a direct negative e®ect on e xd;s but it has a
positive e®ect on U
¤
b by providing some future insider gains.
@e xd;s




1¡¯(¸m(µg)(1 ¡ F(xg)) + (r + ¸)m(µb)(1 ¡ F (xb)):




Note that economic heterogeneity increases the share of dying jobs, since its
negative e®ect on xg is larger than on e x: Furthermore, we have shown that the
value of ¯lling a vacancy with a dying job is more sensitive to changes in the
employment protection than the value of ¯lling a vacancy with a surviving job.
We will see when determining the political equilibrium that this e®ect is im-
portant to distinguish the preferences of "economically homogenous" countries
from the ones of "economically heterogeneous" ones.
Lemma 9 Js







Lemma 10 J s
g(x)¤ ¸ (·)Jb(x)¤ () xb ¸ (·)xs
g





Let us now come back on the vacancy posting decision. We assumed that there
is free entry on the vacancy market, such that vacancies are posted in region k



























Equation [28] establishes a negative relationship between the outside option
Uk and the market tightness µ: The outside option pushes the wages up and
the values of ¯lling a vacancy down, and so reduce the pro¯tability of posting
a vacancy. This equilibrium condition is the ¯rst step in job creation. Hence,
the outside option reduces job creation through two channels: ¯rst, by reducing
the pro¯tability of vacancy posting and, second, by increasing the productivity
required at entry.
Proposition 12 The market is tighter in the good (bad) region if the value of
¯lling a vacancy with a surviving job in a good region is higher (lower) than the
value of ¯lling a vacancy in a bad region: Js





Proof. See Appendix 7.4.
Hence if o®ering a surviving job in a good region is relatively more pro¯table
than in a bad region, independently of the match-speci¯c productivity x, more
vacancies are posted there and the market is tighter in the good region than in
the bad region. The reverse is also true.
Proposition 13 Given U b and U g, an increase in the employment protection
has a negative e®ect on vacancy posting.
19Proof. Using Leibniz rule:
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@cf = [¡(1¡ F (xb)¯] < 0:
Proposition 14 The larger the economic heterogeneity the larger the negative
e®ect of employment protection on vacancy posting. Furthermore, the lower the
good-region insider power, the larger the negative e®ect of employment protection
on the number of vacancies posted in the good region.
Proof. See Appendix 7.5.
The intuition goes as follows. In both regions, the economic heterogeneity
increases the share of matches leading to an employment relationship.That is a
"volume e®ect".
There is an additional e®ect in a good region: The economic heterogeneity
increases the share of dying jobs. Since dying jobs are the jobs for which the
corresponding values of ¯lling a vacancy are the most sensitive to employment
protection, a larger economic heterogeneity makes the employers even more
vulnerable to changes in the employment protection.
The good-region insider power, on the other hand, has the opposite e®ect.
3.6 Migration decision
Let us now turn to the migration decision. All workers can migrate but in
equilibrium only unemployed workers ¯nd it pro¯table to do so. The reason
is that when bargaining over wages, workers take their migration opportunities
into account in determining their outside option. In our framework, migration
implies becoming unemployed in the other region and look for a job over there.
Before migration takes place, the labor market in a region k is composed
of vk vacancies and uk;k resident unemployed. We de¯ne [U¤
g]z and [U¤
b]z the
equilibrium values of being unemployed if no migration would take place (the












Let us now consider the migration decision. An unemployed worker in a
region k, with k = b;g, migrates to the neighboring region when the value of
being unemployed there [U ¤
j ]z; with j 6= k minus the migration cost cm is larger
or equal to the value of being unemployed in her own region:
[U ¤
j ]z ¡ cm ¸ [U ¤
k ]z; (32)
Condition [32] is identical for all unemployed workers, since they are ho-
mogenous.
In equilibrium, migration occurs only in one direction. We show later in this
section that migration occurs from the bad region to the good region.
The larger the di®erence between the values of the unemployed before mi-
gration and the smaller the cost of migration the larger the migration °ow. The
pool of unemployed in the good region is now equal to ug = ug;g + ub;g and in
the bad region is on the other hand ub = ub;b ¡ ub;g where uk;j is the number
of unemployed people migrating from region k to region j:




z ¡ cm ¸ [U
¤
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else uk;j = 0; (33)
where [U¤
j ]m is the equilibrium value of being unemployed in a region j
(after migration).
We see that once condition [32] is met, unemployed workers are better o®
in a good region than in a bad region. And the larger the migration cost the
better o® they are. Why is that? The reason is that unemployed workers in a
good region bene¯t from a region insider power, i.e. from the advantage of being
already in the good region. If there is no migration cost unemployed workers
from the bad region migrate until there is no di®erence anymore between the
values of being unemployed in either region. If migration is too costly for any
21worker, the market is necessarily less tight in a good region than it would have
been with costless migration. Unemployed workers in a good region do not
su®er from the same competition because of this positive migration cost. This
explains why they are relatively better o® than their counterparts in the bad
region.
Let us note however that an in¯nite cost of migration does not mean that the
workers in a good region are in¯nitely better o® than in the bad region. What
happens then is that the labor markets in both regions are completely separated
and the di®erence between the values of being unemployed in either region is
as large as it could be. As soon as the migration cost does give some incentives
to migration the values of being unemployed adjust and converge towards each
other. Hence regional di®erences are attenuated as soon as some migration is
pro¯table.










































































Proposition 16 In equilibrium, migration occurs only from the bad to the good
region.
Proof. Let us assume it is not true, i.e. that migration occurs from the good
region to the bad region. This requires [U¤
g ]z · [U ¤





b and xg ¸ xb () Jb(x) ¸ Jg(x);8x ()
"g
r+2¸ · [U ¤
g ]z ¡ [U ¤
b ]z ()
"g
r+2¸ · 0; which is not possible by assumption ("g > 0):
6See Appendix 7.1 for formal derivations.
22Proposition 17 There are two migration equilibria: a zero-migration (ZM)
equilibrium where no one migrates and a full-migration (FM) equilibrium where
all the unemployed workers in the bad region migrate to the good region.
Proof. If it is too costly for one unemployed worker to migrate, it is too
costly for all of them since they are homogenous. Hence, we do have a ZM
equilibrium. When, on the other hand, migration is pro¯table for one worker,
it will be pro¯table for all of them to migrate. The reason lies in the vacancy
posting decision. Indeed, a tighter labor market means that it is more attractive
for the unemployed workers to migrate over there. But each migrant stimulates
again vacancy posting in the region where she is migrating by reducing the market
tightness. And, similarly, each migrant leaving her region discourages vacancy
posting in her originating region by making the market less tight there. Hence,
there is full migration of all unemployed workers in the bad region and vacancies
are posted in the good region only.
Consequently, the outside options of the worker can be written as:























g]f ¡ cm; (39)
Furthermore, the di®erence between the outside options, i.e. the regional
















b]f = cm; (41)













23which is an monotonically increasing function of cm: Hence, the regional
insider power increases with the migration cost. When the migration cost is
so large that it there is no migration taking place, the di®erence between the
outside options in a good and bad regions is "as large as it could be".
Proposition 18 Ceteris paribus, if two countries end up in di®erent equilib-
ria, it must be that country in the ZM equilibrium is characterized by a higher
migration cost than the country in the FM equilibrium.
Hence, a high migration cost makes it more likely that the country will be
in a zero migration equilibrium. In that case, migration as an insurance device
is not an option.
The di®erential in the values of being unemployed in each region determines
whether migration is attractive or not. Our argument is that economic homo-
geneity and employment protection reduce this di®erential and, therefore, the
attractiveness of migration. Our numerical experiment illustrates the argument.
3.7 Equilibrium
We can now fully characterize the steady-state equilibria.
3.7.1 Unemployment rates
The steady-state unemployment rate is such that the °ows into unemployment
exactly compensate for the out°ows. This equilibrium condition has di®erent
implications in the full and zero migration equilibria.
Full migration equilibrium In the FM equilibrium, all workers becoming
unemployed when a region falls into a slump migrate to the booming region to
search for a job. Hence the unemployment in the stagnating region ub is such
that:









b = 0; (45)








We normalize the total labor force to 1:
ub + ug + eb + eg = 1; (48)
where eg and eb are the employment levels (or rates) in a booming and
stagnating regions respectively.
In a full migration equilibrium the two regional labor markets are uni¯ed













On the LHS we ¯nd the °ow out of unemployment. Remember that all
unemployed workers ¯nd it pro¯table to search for a job in the booming region
and that for that reason, vacancies are posted in that region only. The only
way for an unemployed to escape unemployment in that equilibrium is to ¯nd a
job in the booming region. On the RHS we ¯nd the °ows into unemployment.
Workers become unemployed if they were employed in the booming region, that
the region falls into a slump (this happens with probability ¸) and if they were
in a dying job.
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Note that condition [49] is a linear combination of conditions [50] and [51].
25Zero migration equilibrium The ZM equilibrium is such that the labor
market can be divided into two separate labor markets. Formally we have:
u
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The steady-state is such that the unemployment rate in a stagnating region
and in a booming region are constant over time. Of course this means that in
each region the unemployment rate varies from "high"to"low" levels, depending














The equilibrium °ow condition on the other hand becomes now:
m(µ
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F(e x¤) ¡ F (x¤
g)
1 ¡ F (x¤
g)
¸; (56)
where the basic di®erence with the full migration equilibrium lies in the
existence of a °ow out of unemployment in the stagnating region. Finally, the

























3.8 Voting for employment protection
Let us now turn to the political economy of employment protection. The argu-
ment of our paper is that the preferences with respect to employment protection
depend crucially on the e±ciency of migration as an insurance device. In par-
ticular, we are interested in the roles played by the economic diversity and the
migration costs.
26First, the economic heterogeneity and the migration cost determine in which
equilibrium the economy will be. The role of the migration cost is clear. Eco-
nomic heterogeneity increases the di®erence between the employment thresholds
(xb¡xg) and so implies larger di®erences in job creation, and hence in values of
being unemployed in one region compared to the other. Hence, economic het-
erogeneity increases the migration gains. Hence, more homogenous economies
or economies with high migration costs are more likely to end up in the ZM
equilibrium.
Second, a high economic heterogeneity and low migration costs magnify the
e®ects of employment protection on the market tightness and on the outside
option of the workers. To see this, we plot in Graph 1.0 the job creation and job
destruction conditions in a two-dimensions graph (Ug;µg). Let us consider the
FM equilibrium. Then U ¤
b = U¤
g ¡cm so that we can express the job destruction
condition as a function of Ug and µg: Job creation (JC) is upward-sloping and
job destruction (JD) is downward-sloping. An increase in the ¯ring cost shifts
the JC curve to the left: The number of vacancies posted decreases at each level
of the outside option Ug: The e®ect on the JD curve is ambiguous. If the insider
gains are small, the JD curve shifts to the left also. At each level of market
tightness, the threshold under which job destruction occurs falls which means
that the corresponding outside option goes up. If the insider gains are larger,
the JD curve shifts to the right. What is particularly interesting for our purpose
is that the shift of the JC curve is larger when the economic heterogeneity is
high and the migration costs are low.
Hence, in conclusion, the outside option is much more likely to be deterio-
rated and the market tightness to fall when the economic heterogeneity is high
and the migration costs are low.
3.8.1 The tools
The values of working and the values of being unemployed determine the pref-
erences of the workers. We are especially interested in comparing the roles of
migration and employment protection on these preferences.
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In both equilibria, unemployed workers face a trade-o® between a job ¯nding
rate (with presumably low employment protection) and future insider gains. We
expect that the larger the economic heterogeneity and the smaller the migration
costs, the more likely unemployed prefer high job ¯nding rates to insider gains.
Let us know look at the values of being unemployed in a bad region:
[U¤
b]f = U¤
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It is useful to describe the value of being unemployed in a bad region with
reference to the one in a good region. In the FM case, the di®erence is equal to
cm. Hence, their value is exactly the same as in the good region, except that
they need to migrate now in order to enjoy it. In the ZM case, unemployed
workers in a bad region su®er from the loss of being there now, compared to the
unemployed in a good region.
Let us now turn to the values of being employed. First, consider the case of
employed workers in a good region and in a surviving job:
[W s
g (x)]f = (1 ¡ ¯)[U ¤











g(x)]z = (1 ¡ ¯)[U ¤










The di®erence between the respective values is determined by the di®erence
in their outside option, which is being unemployed in a good region. Employ-
7See Appendix 7.1 for formal derivations
28ment protection gives them some insider power but also reduces the value of
their outside option.
In bad regions, surviving jobs lead to the following values of being employed:
[Wb(x)]
f = (1¡ ¯)([U
¤
g]






[Wb(x)]z = (1¡ ¯)([U¤
g]z ¡ ([U ¤







Employment protection plays the same role as in the surviving jobs in a
good region.
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Here, the outside option of theunemployed workers matter for the bargaining
at the beginning of the employment relationship but also for the future, since
these workers know their jobs will be destroyed as soon as the region falls into
a slump.
In conclusion, the economic heterogeneity and the migration costs determine
the extent to which the outside option is altered by employment protection and
hence, the preferences of the workers (unemployed and employed) with that
respect.
Let us now turn to our numerical experiment.
4 A numerical experiment
In this section, we solve the model explicitly for several con¯gurations of pa-
rameters. The idea is to show that the preferences of the workers with respect
to employment protection are di®erent in a zero-migration equilibrium than in
a full-migration equilibrium.
294.1 Basic example
Our basic numerical example is based on the following assumptions. First,
we assume that f(x) is a uniform distribution de¯ned on the interval [0;1]:
We feature what happens under two di®erent systems: without employment
protection (cf = 0) and with employment protection (cf = 0:5), this in each
equilibrium (zero-migration and full-migration). We propose the following form
for the matching function: m(µ) = aµ
®; with ® > 0:
[Insert Table 2 here]
Assume that one period of time corresponds to half a year. The expected
duration of a boom or a slump is then equal to 1
¸0:5 = 2:5 years, which seems
a reasonable length for each state of the world. The size of the aggregate
productivity di®erential can be related to other variables in the model such as
the average wage that we compute below.
We ¯rst describe the characteristics of the economy under each system and
then look at the preferences of the workers.
[Insert Table 3 here]
Table 3 shows essential features of the two economies. In our example, the
steady-state unemployment rate is higher in the FM equilibrium than in the
ZM equilibrium. Furthermore, the share of dying jobs is larger in the FM
equilibrium. Indeed, the productivity required at entry is relatively smaller
in the FM case and, on the other hand, the productivity threshold between
surviving jobs and dying jobs is higher than in the ZM equilibrium. Hence, the
equilibrium °ows out of and into unemployment are larger in the country that
has the lowest migration cost. Employment protection reduces job creation
(through its negative e®ect on vacancy posting and its positive e®ect on the
productivity required at entry) and job destruction (through its negative e®ect
on the ¯ring productivity °oor e x). It therefore reduces the equilibrium °ows
out of and into unemployment.
Let us now turn to the political equilibrium.
30Graphs 1.1 - 1.4 plot the value functions for the workers in both systems,
against the match-speci¯c productivity x: The dashed line corresponds in all
graphs to the asset value of a worker, in the absence of employment protection
(i.e. cf = 0), as a function of her position on the labor market (her position
changes with x from unemployed to employed in a dying job and, ¯nally, em-
ployed in a surviving job). The continuous line on the other hand plots the asset
value of a worker in the presence of employment protection (cf = 0:5):They in-
clude all categories of workers, except the unemployed who did not match with
any ¯rm. The asset value for these unemployed corresponds however exactly
to the asset value of the unemployed who did get a match but not productive
enough to lead to a contract.
Graph 1.1 and 1.2present tothe value functions in the good region in the FM
and ZM equilibria respectively and Graph 1.3 and 1.4 present the value functions
in the bad region for both equilibria again. We see that unemployed are better
o® with no employment protection, in both equilibria. Unemployed workers
care more about ¯nding a job in the present than enjoying insider gains in the
future. Employed workers who would be in a dying job without employment
protection and unemployed if there was employment protection also prefer no
employment protection in either equilibrium. All other employed workers on the
other hand di®er in their preferences according to the equilibrium type. In the
full migration equilibrium, they all would vote against employment protection,
while in the zero migration equilibrium, they would vote in favor of it. Given
that these employed workers are in majority in both equilibria, we conclude that
the political equilibrium in our example is di®erent in both equilibria. Among
these workers, three categories can be distinguished: workers who would be
in a dying job in either system, workers who would be in a dying job in the
"no-employment protection system" and in a surviving job in the "employment
protection system" and, ¯nally, workers who would be in a surviving job in
either system. Low productive workers prefer no employment protection when
migration is costless. They trade insider gains for high job ¯nding and ¯ring
rates, so that they can move fast to better horizons rather than being maintained
31in low productive activities. In our example, more productive workers prefer
no employment protection. The reason is that their outside option is then
much better than with employment protection. The gains from high mobility
possibilities dominate the insider gains they could bene¯t from in a system with
employment protection. All these arguments do not hold for workers who cannot
migrate to the neighboring region. These workers prefer employment protection
in order to enjoy insider gains and, for some of them, have their job safe.
[Insert Graph 1.1-1.4 here]
In this particular example, we ¯nd that 73.4% of the workers support em-
ployment protection in the zero migration equilibrium against 0% in the full
migration equilibrium.
This example shows then that the same con¯guration of parameters can lead
to very di®erent preferences with respect to the employment protection system
depending on the migration possibilities. In our example, if the migration cost
is higher than 1:16 ([U¤
g]z ¡[U¤
b]z)) workers do not ¯nd it worthwhile to migrate
to the neighboring region in order to ¯nd a job. Hence, if the migration cost is
somewhat larger than the productivity di®erential it is not pro¯table to move
and the majority of workers prefer employment to be protected by a ¯ring cost.
Furthermore, we ¯nd the two sides of the relationship between migration and
employment protection: The di®erence between the two equilibria indicate that
a lower migration cost makes employment protection less attractive. The di®er-
ence between the two last columns of Table 2 shows that a stronger employment
protection reduces the number of workers migrating (since the proportion of dy-
ing jobs e x ¡ xg is the lowest with employment protection and all ¯red workers
migrate).
4.2 Sensitivity analysis
4.2.1 Modifying parameters ¸ and "g
In addition to the migration costs, we argued that the degree of economic hetero-
geneity played an important role in determining the preferences of the workers.
32Hence, two parameters are likely to play an important role in determining the
political equilibrium: the transition probability between the states of the world
(¸) and the regional productivity di®erential ("g). We expect that an increase
in the parameters ¸ and "g lead to a fall in the political support for EPL. We
report the results in Table 4. Indeed we ¯nd that the political support drops
with these two parameters. Also striking is the "sudden drop" in political sup-
port at some critical values. The reason for this is that the valuation functions
are parallel, so that at one point, all the workers in surviving jobs prefer no
employment protection and this brings the share of voters to 0.
[Insert Table 4 here]
Hence, weargue that the size of the United states (and the economic diversity
associated with it) contributes to the low support for employment protection.
4.2.2 Modifying the political choice
Our example assumed a simple choice between no employment protection and
employment protection. The political choice in the real world is certainly more
complex than that. What is important is that our simple example enables us
to draw the following conclusion: Ceteris Paribus (i.e. given a con¯guration
of parameters), countries with a relatively low migration cost demand a lower
level of employment protection than countries with a high migration cost. The
con¯guration of parameters determine the level of employment protection that
is preferred. Hence, we showed that when the regional productivity di®erentials
were low some workers would prefer to have some employment protection.
4.2.3 The distribution function f(x)
We assumed that the distribution of productivities was uniform, which does
probably not ¯t the real world either. One should expect that the density of
low skilled matches should be higher than in this example. In the full migration
equilibrium especially, those are the people who matter in the political choice,
i.e. this is the category of workers to which the median voter is likely to belong.
33We saw that low productive workers were the ¯rst to prefer employment protec-
tion once the regional productivity di®erential was becoming large enough. This
means that in reality the switch between political equilibria probably happen
even earlier than what our model predicts.
5 Discussion
5.1 Negatively correlated shocks and political entity
Migration and employment protection are inter-related to the extent that one
considers the same entities for one and the other, i.e. what determines the pref-
erences of workers with respect to employment protection is the extent to which
migration is pro¯table within the country (if one supposes that the country is
the level at which employment protection is set).
Hence, the migration costs and economic heterogeneity between political en-
tities do not determine in the same way the preferences of the workers with
respect to employment protection. Indeed, the levels of employment protection
are determined independently in each political entity. For that reason, migration
between countries cannot be regarded as a reliable insurance device for the me-
dian voter since she has no idea what level of EPL the other entities will choose
and so has no idea about how easy it might be to ¯nd a job in the neighbor-
ing political entity/ies. This means that the barriers to labor mobility between
European countries cannot be used here as an argument for the relatively high
levels of employment protection in Europe. However what our model can tell
concerning the European Union is that if employment protection would be ¯xed
at the European level rather than at the country level there would probably no
desire for lower protection. The reason is that, despite a large economic het-
erogeneity, there are important cultural and language barriers resulting in high
migration costs.
In our model the regional shocks are perfectly negatively correlated. Our
result relies on the existence of some heterogeneity, this extreme assumption
being just made for simplicity.
345.2 Interaction with other institutions
Saint-Paul (1997) argues that the reason why Europeans desire a higher level
of employment protection lies in the existence of other institutions, such as
powerful unions. One may displace the question one step back and ask why do
the Europeans have stronger unions? Indeed, the forces leading to the existence
of powerful unions are likely to be similar to the forces leading to the existence
of employment protection. The argument used in this paper could be used to
justify di®erences in institutions in°uencing job creation and insider gains in the
same way as employment protection. Hence, generous unemployment insurances
(leading to high taxes on labor through a social security budget constraint) and
strong unions can also be thought as institutions deterring vacancy postingwhile
providing workers with insider gains. There are number of studies pointing out
the di®erences between the US and Europe from these perspectives (see Hassler
et al. (2001) for a recent contribution on the di®erences in unemployment
insurance systems and Wallerstein (1989) for a contribution on the di®erences
in unions structure). Wallerstein observes that there is a negative relationship
between the size of the country to the degree of unionization. His argument
is that the proportion of the labor force unionized determines the gains from
unionization while the size of the labor force determines the costs of unionization
(organizational costs). Hence, smaller countries are characterized by stronger
unions.
5.3 Firing costs and severance payments
In this paper, we considered the ¯ring cost as a pure waste for the ¯rm and
the society. However, employment protection also includes rules guiding the
severance payments from the ¯rm to the worker (see OECD (1999)). Adding
this type of ¯ring cost would not change anything to our results. The reason is
that a severance payment reduces the bargained wages and constitute therefore
a kind of forced saving. In our framework, the worker would be completely
indi®erent between a system with or without severance payment.
356 Concluding remarks
The objective of this paper was to explain the observed di®erences in employ-
ment protection between the United States and European countries. The expla-
nation we provide here is that migration does not work as well as an insurance
device in Europe than in the United States. There are two reasons for that:
First, the United States form a large country, with a high degree of economic
diversity. Most European countries are small and de¯nitely more homogenous
than the United States. Second, even in the presence of economic incentives
to migration within their country, Europeans do not respond with migration.
This suggests that there are important migration costs, that can be linked to
institutional structures (such as housing regulations or other welfare support
systems) or social and cultural barriers.
In this paper, we argue that the economic heterogeneity and the migration
costs play a crucial role in determining the preferences of the workers with
respect to employment protection. Employment protection typically reduces
the job ¯nding and ¯ring rates and so also reduces the e±ciency of migration
as an insurance device. Hence, when the structure of the country is such that
migration would be attractive, workers are likely to support a "no employment
protection" system. If it is not, on the other hand, workers prefer enjoying
insider gains and safe jobs.
Our model provides an interesting prediction with respect to the European
Union. According to the empirical evidence, Euro-Land is more heterogeneous
than the United States. This means that if employment protection would be
decided at the European level, it could be that it is not as strongly supported
by the workers as before. However, as long as some large social and cultural
di®erences would subsist, it would be maintained strong. Similarly, the imple-
mentation of a reform of the employment protection system (if one would be
convinced that is welfare-improving) would be much easier to implement in a so-
ciety made more mobile than in a society where workers are very much attached
to their local roots.
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The wage maximizes the following Nash-bargaining program:
ws





g(x) ¡ U g
¢¯ ¡
Js
g(x) ¡ Vg + cf
¢1¡¯
; (71)
where U g is the outside option of a worker in a good region. It corresponds to
the value of becoming unemployed in a good region and is equal to max[U ¤
g;U ¤
b ¡
cm]. We show later that migration from agood toa bad region is never pro¯table
so that U g = U¤
g:
In the bad region, the maximization program is:
w
s





(Jb(x) ¡ Vb + cf)
1¡¯; (72)
where U b is the outside option of a worker in a bad region. These workers
can either migrate to the neighboring (booming) region or stay in their region.
Hence, Ub = max[U¤
b ;U ¤
g ¡ cm]: In the FM equilibrium all workers ¯nd if prof-





g]f ¡ cm and in the ZM equilibrium all
unemployed workers stay in their region, so [Ub]z = [U¤
b ]z, where the subscripts
are self-explanatory.
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The equilibrium wage ws
g(x)¤ is then:
ws
g(x)¤ = (1¡ ¯)((r + ¸)Ug ¡ ¸U b) + ¯ (x + "g + rcf); (83)
The same reasoning is applied to calculate the equilibrium wage in the stag-
nating region wb(x)¤. We then get that:
38wb(x)
¤ = (1¡ ¯)((r + ¸)Ub ¡ ¸U g) + ¯ (x + rcf); (84)
The maximization program for a dying job is the following:
wd
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The equilibrium wage for a dying job in a booming region wd
g(x)¤ is then:
wd
g(x)¤ = (1¡ ¯)
¡
¸(U g ¡ Ub) + rUg
¢
+ ¯(x + "g + rcf); (90)
Let us characterize the wages in the FM and ZM cases:






g]f and [Ub]f = [U ¤
g ]f ¡ cm:
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39[wd





+ ¯(x + "g + rcf); (93)
The equilibrium wage structure associated with the ZM equilibrium is com-
puted by substituting [Ug]z = [U¤















z)) + ¯ (x + "g + rcf); (94)
[wb(x)
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+ ¯(x + "g + rcf); (96)
The equilibrium value of being unemployed can now be derived:
The value of being unemployed in a good region is:
rU
¤


















b = b+ m(µ
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and on the other hand we have:





(E(Jg(x) ¡ Vg) + cf(1 ¡ F (x¤
g)); (99)


















(E(Jb(x) ¡ Vb) + cf(1¡ F(x¤
b)); (101)



























































































Proof. Straightforward, given that we have already shown that xg · xb:
7.2 Matching values



































(1¡ ¯)(r + 2¸) x + (1¡ ¯)(r + ¸)"g
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r (r + 2¸)
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x + "g ¡ wd
g(x) + ¸(Vb ¡ cf)
r + ¸
; (111)




(1¡ ¯)(x + "g) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)
¡
¸(Ug ¡ U b) + rU g
¢
¡ (r¯ + ¸)cf
r + ¸
; (112)














g(x) (r + ¸) + ¸wb(x)
r (r + 2¸)
; (114)
















































g (e xd;s) = W
s
g (e xd;s); (119)






@x . Hence, workers on surviving
jobs are also wanting their jobs to survive.
427.3 Thresholds
Let us now calculate the "employment" productivity thresholds xg and xb and





g is such that J d
g (xd
g) = 0; and xs








(1¡ ¯)(r + 2¸) xs
g + (1¡ ¯)(r + ¸)"g
¡(1 ¡ ¯)
¡
r(r + 2¸) Ug
¢
¡ (r + 2¸)¯rcf










Hence xb is such that:
J b
g(xb) =
(1 ¡ ¯) (r + 2¸)xb + (1 ¡ ¯)¸"g
¡(1¡ ¯)
¡
r (r + 2¸)U b
¢
¡ (r + 2¸)¯rcf
r(r + 2¸)
= 0; (123)
() xb = ¡
¸
(r + 2¸)
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The threshold between a dying and surviving job e x is de¯ned as follows:
e x = minfx
s
g; e xd;sg; (127)
43where e xd;s is such that:
J
d
g (e xd;s) = J
s
g(e xd;s); (128)
() (1 ¡ ¯)
e xd;s
r
+ (1 ¡ ¯)
(r + ¸)"g
r (r + 2¸)








¡ (1 ¡ ¯)
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@x so that ¯rms are indeed wanting sur-
viving jobs to survive.
7.4 Proof of proposition 12
Suppose there are no dying jobs. Then J s
g(x)¤ ¸ (·)Jb(x)¤ ) xb ¸ (·)xs
g )





Suppose there are dying jobs, Then J s
g(x)¤ ¸ (·)Jb(x)¤ ) xb ¸ (·)xs
g and 8x 2
[xd
g;e x]:Jd
g (x)¤ ¸ J s
g(x)¤ ) xd
g · xs
g · xb and xd






7.5 Proof of proposition 14








(F(e x) ¡ F(x
d
g)) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ F (e x))
¸
; (131)








(e x ¡ xd
g) ¡ ¯(1 ¡ e x)
¸
; (132)












































2 ¡ r2¯ ¡ 3¸r
(r + ¸) (r + 2¸)
< 0; (137)
Furthermore, given Ug :
@2E(Jg)





Hence, high economic heterogeneity and low good-region insider power mag-
nify the negative e®ect of the ¯ring cost on the expected value of ¯lling a vacancy
in the good region.
In the bad region:
@E(Jb)
@cf

















"g < 0; (141)
Hence, also in the bad region, a larger economic heterogeneity ampli¯es the
negative e®ect of the ¯ring cost on the expected value of ¯lling a vacancy in the
bad region.
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Table 1 - Summary of EPL indicators 
Late 80s Late 90s Late 80s Late 90s Late 80s Late 90s
Anglo-Saxon countries
United States 0.2 0.2 0 0 0.5 0.5
United Kingdom 0.8 0.8 0 0 0.5 0.5
Canada 0.9 0.9 0 0 0.5 0.5
Australia 1.0 1.0 1.3 1.3 0.5 0.5
Ireland 1.6 1.6 0 0 0.5 0.5
New Zealand 1.7 0.3 0.5
Contintental Europe (West)
Switzerland 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.3 0.5 0.5
Belgium 1.5 1.5 5.3 2 4 3.5
France 2.3 2.3 3.5 4 2.6 3.3
Austria 2.6 2.6 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8
Germany 2.7 2.8 3.5 1.8 4 2.8
Netherlands 3.1 3.1 1.5 0.8 3.3 1.6
Norhern Europe
Denmark 1.6 1.6 1.3 1.3 4 0.5
Finland 2.7 2.1 3.3 3.3 0.5 0.5
Norway 2.4 2.4 3.3 3.3 3.8 2.3
Sweden 2.8 2.8 2.7 1.8 5.5 1.5
Southern Europe
Greece 2.5 2.4 4 4 5.5 5.5
Spain 3.9 2.6 1.5 3 5.5 4
Italy 2.8 2.8 5.3 4.3 5.5 3.3

















Worker's relative bargaining power ¯
Probability of a transition ¸
Regional productivity increment "g
Value of leisure / unemployment bene¯t b





















Average wage (good region)

























No EPL: cf=0; EPL:cf=0:5
Table 4 - Political support for EPL in the FM equilibrium
"g ¡!
¸ #
0.1 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.1 94.1 86.5 75.6 67.7 61.2 58.2 0
0.2 92.2 84.4 74.4 67.8 62.8 0 0
0.3 90.4 82.1 72.2 66.0 61.6 0 0
0.4 88.6 79.8 69.7 63.8 59.6 0 0
0.5 86.9 77.5 67.2 61.3 57.3 0 0
0.6 85.1 75.2 62.7 58.8 54.8 0 0
0.7 83.4 73.0 62.2 56.3 52.3 0 0
0.8 81.7 70.9 59.7 53.8 49.8 0 0
0.9 80.0 68.8 57.3 51.3 47.3 0 0
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Graph 1.1 – Full migration – Voting preferences – Good region 
 
Graph 1.2 – Zero migration – Voting preferences – Good region 
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Graph 1.4 – Zero migration – Voting preferences – Bad region 
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